

7-5-12

(Home-from-hospital
How far back off
(Morris, Robert)

K's C-II scene was exactly — no more, no less —

creaky

netless

ill-curved

involved

clear well-mixed to a complex of motifs,
instrumental

politic

effective

as our NATO policy

too over to Henry (Huan planes...)

IRBHs to Turkey, Italy, UK (Huan, France)

on the news is Warsaw Pact territory

much better than SAC-alert! (cf. air alert?)

(too over our much less likely to be
triggered — unusually ^{in person} by false alarm — in
absence of actual shooting attack (non-acc,
than SAC or the aircraft. Very unstable to
non-acc attacks (non-acc, protest)

though in theory (+ by SAC) could be withheld to higher
command.

2.

Even smart leaders can make — and permit in,
unabridged — very absurd, unrealistic, "crazy,
absurd," premise, expectation, estimate, critical
to policy (its feasibility, its course

RBE: What are 4 or 5 things people don't
know about C-I; and lessons to be drawn...

(You have to be — smart, complex, confident (pious...)
to construct catastrophes like these

Not being able to comprehend motivations of
your adversaries — or the perception of our
policies...

Then people like to go for the Big Kicker,
against the odds, Win Everything...

It's not

("We could never — never — be so stupid as to invade
a country for no reason (?), with us for
occupations

— find a nuclear plant in the biggest earthquake
zone, subject to terrorism

— risk the global economy...

(also of Bent & Brightest...

2-5-12

NO - was NATO (now) the means to keep

Control of Bank ministers: one US officer with by
(to be threatened or overpowered or persuaded)

the + JFK never believed in ministers

Was K decision to put MRBMs in Cuba better than
US decision to put in Turkey?

(approval of K; criticism (2d thoughts) of the
(+ AW + me)

But K didn't have so attractive

to the VPK side - as Attas, MY, Poland's

by repeated bluff vs US

(esp. US Europe not being
stronger, apparently, to date,
w/ US - a change
"2d-tier states - like Europe?"
(couldn't threaten SU)

|| and threat of VA was useful for
deterring attack - a real threat to Cuba.

basis the same: FA:
The objections to deployment of prohibits didn't
apply to Cuba - giving incentives to "be helpful"
of Cuba (+ capture of SU control, while Flower)
+ except for (!) poss. of vicious superior response:

Was it helpful / important to the US,
or the world

as distinct from other, up to
to JFK's father, etc, the Dec-

to doing SO negotiation as "equal
persons, equal rights" — by public trade
(or by letting markets stay)?

Saltzman appeared to have compelled
K to back off without making any concessions —
been doing something US had "promised
itself to do," and would continue to do

— Confusing a US Admin for beyond its
boundaries, and we need Admin for SO right
on its borders

7-4-2

See Bush mission, to see
K & Bush: Would you really go to see us over Berlin?

|| (JFK = NO - or for Cuba (but alone, Turk missing)
(cond) (pro. Bernstein reference; stone?)

but what side would he & others take?

Congress?

Democrat?

K did feel WH (JFK)

& Bush, Bing: see U-2

K's side were not as great as they
unlike have been -

- if JFK didn't believe Bolshakov
- (if U-2 had shot U-2 and kept flying)
- IF EITHER JFK or K had wanted what by
fair!

- still analysts did blunder as: MRBMs

too over

wounded

K blundered:

SU units

- scheduling (SGBs)
- Camouflage
- no back-up: confidence is missing
- no plan to answer too many

(ADW: consider from. every will set "rationally".
Reason:

invasion plans for Cuba.

(Stevenson was right (Mifflin, Rand agreeing)

JFK had reason to feel confident

(not)

p. 8

(1) Third World
 C-II Convergence of our TV empire, legions
 problems in former colonial (Spain, US!)
 states, or "little sphere" (Hull), ~~but~~ but
 like big ^{little} sphere VX, Indonesia, Malaysia, SVN/VN,
 (Taiwan), South Korea, [Japan] from Saudi Arabia,
 [Israel]; confrontation

(2) our core sphere — West Europe + Berlin
 (Japan?)

(Note: in first instance: ~~FOR USA~~
 FU threat of US

(assumption)

us. invasion

= US NATO
 policy

BUT: FU threat of SU (UA) (two areas)
 FU threat of SU (UA:) us. invasion (MRBM's)
 FS threat of SU (MRBM) us. US FU: ^{FI-28s} ~~Europe~~
 delegation possible

7-10-12

Were there any serious contingency plans for
winning Cuba after Nov 1962?

PDS
Hussein

If not - any not? Provision?

Proventis continued? (from outside US)

Spy ship?

(Northwoods - after '62?)

Did JFK & RFK really give up on regime change? NO!

Under LBJ?

(C-I fly speak

Give up on mission?

Assass.

Revels...

Did K give up on Berlin?

Brezhnev?

What became of the control of arms fighter-bombers
on alert?

(Were K or B confident we would not
give arms to West Germany?

or help them do underground testing,
like France?

Did K give up plans for arms?

Was SU sure we or K would not
return in October/November 1968? (in Poland?)

to not copy - more (or less) than us, whole CW present.

It was legal, logical, effective for K to
and wishes (and the way + troops) to be -
or, as much as as the whole NATO being
(or more) - no more - or less - crazy

"if he could get away with it -

and 1) he almost did^{as he}, (except for Castro)

2) if he'd played it right, he could have
done so with less cost;

3) as it was, although it was unnecessary
of him to suppose camouflage was adequate,
or that JFK would be sure)

he could have pulled it off (both the ones

He played it badly, except for temporary failure

1) Miss up to Oct 22 (Mikoyan -

2) Miss until Oct 26 (via UN) (Dale)

3) not displaying before SRK operation

4) not making the ones

5) making the ones

6) with one troubles: (+ not letting!)

Believing Swigunov
7) Not coordinating w. Castro on camouflage

8) Believing JFK could keep secret 3-4 weeks

9) assuming JFK didn't know until Oct 22

10) Delegation to Playa on the ones.

11) no Frank II

2-10-77

Announcement of GSA (or attack) "Option"
"Round"

Not known:

wf us war

Asymmetry of base balance

& dislike "base" to back down; (vs. me)

could base fight over us; or public trade;

from VPR as apparent; act. Jackson

(likely to be found out bluffing;
to back down

"Surprise" if attack carried out:

C-II

GW (over us)

(~~as~~ in SH killed

(If then has over

"GW a certainty" NO - with wot promise over
or unilateral. disarm
"absl."

Human vs. "risk of GW vs. some s-t loss"

(or: ^{unilateral} ~~unilateral~~ min. det: stable

Extended det v. brakif ("Kenny, paper")

"as if US attacked. we'll be as crazy in
response"

"you can't (be forced) bluff (ing)"

But K was forced bluffing, on + on...

Gap;

Berlin (1948, 1958, 1960, 1961, ¹⁹⁶²~~1962~~)

C-II !

JFK: Laos '61

C-I

(VN '61) (+ realities to put in track

C-II (not caught) (but ready to be!)

CBJ: (to VCI) realities of mobility

etc ~ NVN...

Report

JFK expected to come out with a

bugged-up public track (as in VN, '65!)

(on basis of threats / bluffs).

Hopefully " " " "

only task minors: if not stand, US, + Berlin

risks ("small" risks) of regional or GW

(longer can be thought: TN was (more unwise))

(VN x M: continuity of problems: only a small difference between a small / 20) risk and 0.

Can risk or try to go to the ground:

if risk is tight enough, try time enough

NO NO NO

7-10-12

JFK was ready to concede - if necessary -
from the start - yet political circus
above everything

(He should not have allowed the ASW
(against his warnings - & McNamara's)

or air alert! or dispersal
(unnecessary!)

low-level pass? U-2?

He used McCombs street - but as a bluff, for which he (XUS) ^{would have paid.}

|| Why didn't JFK & RFK think alt. would
work? (as I would have; McCombs...)

(Private deal not enough; but why not
alt. to start?)

Became a deal that was U-2? (!)